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SENTENCING GUIDELINES  
IN ENGLAND AND WALES: 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND 
EMERGING ISSUES 
JULIAN V. ROBERTS* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
To date, scholarship on sentencing guidelines has understandably focused 
on the experiences across the United States, where guidelines have been 
evolving since the 1970s. Unlike other American innovations, the U.S. guideline 
schemes have failed to find a market outside of the United States. Canada 
explicitly rejected the use of presumptive guidelines in the 1980s, Western 
Australia in 2000, while England and Wales declined their adoption in 2008.1 
Having rejected the U.S. model, a number of other jurisdictions have been 
developing guideline schemes of different kinds.2 Among these countries, 
England and Wales has made the greatest progress; definitive guidelines have 
now been issued for most offenses. In fact, this is the only jurisdiction3 outside 
the United States to have developed and implemented a comprehensive system 
of guidance, consisting of offense-specific guidelines as well as generic 
guidelines.4 This article describes and explores recent developments in 
England.5 
Although the effects of various reforms and specific guidelines have been 
studied for decades, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the 
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 1.  See generally Julian V. Roberts, Structuring Sentencing in Canada and England and Wales: A 
Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 23 CRIM. L.F. 319 (2012). 
 2.  A guideline scheme based upon starting sentences was proposed in Israel. See Oren Gazal-
Ayal & Ruth Kannai, Determination of Starting Sentences in Israel—System and Application, 22 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 232, 232 (2010). This system has yet to be implemented, although reform legislation was 
passed in January 2012. 
 3.  The Law Commission of New Zealand has developed a comprehensive and thoughtful set of 
guidelines, but these have yet to be implemented. See Warren Young & Claire Browning, New 
Zealand’s Sentencing Council, 2008 CRIM. L. REV. 287. 
 4.  All guidelines are available at the website of the Sentencing Council, http://sentencingcouncil. 
judiciary.gov.uk/. 
 5.  Hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, I will refer to this jurisdiction simply as England, but with 
no disrespect to my Welsh forefathers intended. 
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impact of English sentencing guidelines in practice. This observation will 
surprise scholars who have been aware of the evolving English guidelines since 
1999. Why, one may reasonably ask, are we only now beginning to understand 
the effects of these guidelines? The explanation lies in fact that until relatively 
recently, the guidelines authority in this jurisdiction lacked the mandate and the 
resources to monitor the application of its own guidelines. Fortunately, this 
state of affairs is now changing. 
A.  Overview of Article 
Developments in England carry important lessons for other jurisdictions, 
particularly those interested in structuring sentencers’ discretion without 
adopting a U.S.-style sentencing grid. Part I offers some brief commentary on 
the historical origins of the guidelines. This is followed by a concise chronology 
of recent events, including passage of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This 
Act amended the compliance requirement on courts and created a new 
statutory guidelines authority that commenced its work in April 2010. 
The Sentencing Council of England has significantly broader powers and 
responsibilities than its predecessors, and correspondingly has greater research 
resources as well. The Council has revamped the guideline structure and the 
new format is described using a common offense to illustrate the English 
sentencing methodology. The final section of the article addresses some 
important challenges confronting the English guidelines and the Sentencing 
Council. This includes the way in which guidelines and guidelines authorities 
respond to novel or unexpected waves of criminality that have the potential to 
create a “punitive surge.” England was confronted with such a scenario in 
August 2011 when riots took place in many cities, and I describe the role and 
response of the courts and the guidelines. To the extent possible, the discussion 
is situated within the context of the guideline schemes found in the United 
States and proposed in New Zealand. 
B.  The Context 
Like judges in almost all other common law jurisdictions, sentencers in 
England have long enjoyed wide discretion, restricted only by appellate review 
and a limited number of mandatory sentences. All of this changed in 1998 with 
the creation of an advisory body, the Sentencing Advisory Panel (SAP), a 
development that marked the inception of more structured sentencing. The 
SAP was responsible for advising the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, which 
then considered this advice in developing its guideline judgments.6 In 2003, the 
guidelines movement shifted up a gear when the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
created a second statutory body, the Sentencing Guidelines Council (SGC).7 
 
 6.  See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38 (William Twining et al. 
eds., 5th ed. 2010); Andrew Ashworth, The Sentencing Guideline System in England and Wales, 19 S. 
AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (2006). 
 7.  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 167. 
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Henceforth, the SAP provided its advice to the SGC, which then devised and 
ultimately issued definitive guidelines following extensive consultation. The 
next important step occurred with passing the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.8 
The reforms introduced by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 may be traced 
to two developments. First, the high and rising prison population in England 
prompted the government to commission a review of the use of imprisonment 
and of sentencing guidelines.9 The second development was creating a Working 
Group, which recommended a revamp of the current arrangements, rather than 
adoption of a completely new system of guidelines.10 U.S.-style sentencing grids 
were rejected by the Sentencing Commission Working Group as being 
inappropriately restrictive and contrary to the traditions of English sentencing. 
The rather unwieldy, bicameral structure comprised of the SAP and the SGC 
was reviewed in 2008 by the Sentencing Commission Working Group (SCWG), 
which recommended a series of modifications to the guidelines environment in 
this jurisdiction.11 Sentencing in England entered another era in 2010 as a result 
of reforms introduced by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. A new statutory 
body, the Sentencing Council for England, replaced the SAP and the SGC. The 
creation of a single guidelines authority was intended to promote more effective 
development and dissemination of guidelines. A great deal has changed as a 
result of the latest legislation—for example, the Sentencing Council has a 
significantly wider range of duties than its predecessors. 
C.  Statutory Duties of the Sentencing Council 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 imposes a wide range of duties on the 
new Council, in addition to the primary function of producing guidelines.12 The 
Council also has to monitor the operation and effects of its guidelines. 
Additionally, it must draw conclusions about the factors that influence 
sentences imposed by the courts, the effect of the guidelines on consistency in 
sentencing, and the effect of the guidelines on public confidence in the criminal 
justice system. Promoting public confidence is also a priority for the new 
Council. A number of commentators have argued that this is a central function 
 
 8.  Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25. 
 9.  See LORD CARTER OF COLES, SECURING THE FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR THE EFFICIENT 
AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF CUSTODY IN ENGLAND AND WALES (2007), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_12_07_prisons.pdf. 
 10.  SENTENCING COMM’N WORKING GROUP, SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (2008), available at http://www.parliament.wa. 
gov.au/intranet/libpages.nsf/WebFiles/ITS+-+sent+councils+report+evolutionary+approach+08/$FILE/ 
sentencing-guidelines-evolutionary-approach.pdf. 
 11.  Id. For further discussion of the events leading up to creation of the Sentencing Council, see 
generally Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing Council, 2010 CRIM. L. REV. 
389; Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Discretion: Evolution of the Duty of Courts 
to Comply in England and Wales, 51 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2011). 
 12.  Sections 127–30 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 specify a list of “other functions” of the 
Council. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, §§ 127–30. 
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of a sentencing guidelines authority.13 It has been suggested that sentencing 
councils and commissions need to do more than simply devise and distribute 
guidelines—they have to be promoted to stakeholders in the field of sentencing 
as well as to the general public. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 also states 
that the Council “may promote awareness of matters relating to the sentencing 
of offenders . . . in particular . . . the cost of different sentences and their relative 
effectiveness in preventing re-offending.”14 
The Sentencing Council is required to publish a report about “non-
sentencing factors” that are likely to have an impact on the resources needed 
for sentencing.15 These non-sentencing factors include (but are not limited to) 
recalls of prisoners released to the community, breaches of community orders, 
patterns of re-offending, decisions taken by the Parole Board of England, and 
considerations relating to the remand prison population.16 Finally, the Council is 
also charged with assessing the impact of all proposed government policies and 
legislation that may affect the provision for prison places, probation, and youth 
justice services.17 Taken together, the tasks represent a radical departure from 
the far more restricted duties of the previous organizations responsible for 
devising and disseminating sentencing guidelines.18 The ensemble of duties is 
also more extensive than those imposed upon sentencing commissions and 
councils in other jurisdictions. 
II 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN ENGLAND: THE NEW FORMAT 
The Council’s first definitive guideline, covering the offenses of assault, 
came into effect on June 13, 2011.19 This guideline replaced the definitive assault 
guideline issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Council in 2008. The guideline 
assumes a new structure and will serve as a model for all future guidelines 
issued by the Council. The Council has now issued a number of other offense-
specific guidelines, including drugs and burglary. Over time, the Council will re-
format and re-issue the existing guidelines in the new format; however, since 
definitive guidelines must be preceded by an extensive public and professional 
 
 13.  See, e.g., MIKE HOUGH AND JESSICA JACOBSON, CREATING A SENTENCING COMMISSION 
FOR ENGLAND AND WALES: AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE PRISONS CRISIS (2008). 
 14.  Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 129(2). 
 15.  Id. § 131(1). 
 16.  Id. § 131(4). 
 17.  Id. § 132(1). 
 18.  Despite its expanded range of duties, the new Council is a smaller body than its predecessors. 
The SAP–SGC had a combined membership of up to twenty-five members while the new Council is 
composed of fifteen individuals: seven members of the judiciary (six judges and one lay magistrate), six 
criminal justice professionals, one academic, and is headed by its President—the Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales. 
 19.  The definitive assault guideline as well as all guidelines issued by the previous statutory 
authority may be found at http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk. 
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consultation,20 it will take several years before all the guidelines issued by the 
previous Council are replaced. For the foreseeable future, then, sentencers in 
England will need two sets of guidelines on hand when sentencing, with the 
relevant guideline being determined by the offense for which the sentence is 
being imposed. 
A.  General Approach to Structuring Sentencers’ Discretion 
Sentencing consistency is pursued in various ways in different guidelines. 
Some systems—such as those found in U.S. jurisdictions—achieve consistency 
by specifying ranges of sentences and by discouraging departures from those 
ranges.21 In contrast, the guidelines in England promote uniformity at 
sentencing by prescribing a sequence of steps for courts to follow when 
sentencing an offender, while also allowing a significant degree of discretion. 
Since the guideline reflects a structure derived from the statute, it is important 
also to consider Section 125 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which 
identifies the duties of a court with respect to the guidelines. The revised 
guideline structure contains a series of nine steps, of which the first two are the 
most critical.22 
B.  Example: Domestic Burglary 
The definitive guideline for domestic burglary illustrates the new guidelines 
format.23 As with most offenses for which a definitive guideline has been issued, 
this offense is stratified into three levels of seriousness. The guideline provides a 
separate range of sentence and starting point sentence for each seriousness 
category. Step one, and indeed section 125(3)(b) of the Coroners and Justice 
Act, requires a court to match the case at bar to one of the three categories of 
seriousness.24 The three categories reflect gradations in harm and culpability, 
with the most serious category, category 1, requiring greater harm and 
enhanced culpability. Category 2 is appropriate if either greater harm or higher 
culpability is present, while category 3 requires a court to find that the case 
being sentenced involves both lesser harm and a lower level of culpability. 
 
 20.  See Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c, 25, § 120(6). 
 21.  See Andrew Ashworth, Techniques for Reducing Sentence Disparity, in PRINCIPLED 
SENTENCING 243, 249–54 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009). 
 22.  Appendix A, infra, contains a summary of the steps. 
 23.  SENTENCING COUNCIL, BURGLARY OFFENCES: DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE (2011), available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary_Definitive_Guideline_web_final.pdf. There is 
an additional complication when sentencing for this offense. When sentencing an offender for a third 
domestic burglary, the Court must apply section 111 of the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) 
Act 2000 and impose a custodial term of at least three years, unless it is satisfied that there are 
particular circumstances relating to any of the offenses or to the offender that would make it unjust to 
do so. Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act, 2000, c. 6, § 111. 
 24.  Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 125(3)(b).  
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C.  Determining the Offense Category 
Step one of the guideline identifies an exhaustive list of factors to determine 
which of the three categories is most appropriate for the case being sentenced. 
These factors constitute what the guideline describes as the “principal factual 
elements of the offence,” and their primordial status is reflected in the fact that 
determination of the category range is the step that has the greatest influence 
on severity of sentence. This is clear from examining the respective category 
ranges. For example, the lowest level of seriousness (category 3) carries a 
sentence range running from a low-level community order to twenty-six-weeks 
custody, whereas the highest category sentence range runs from two to six years 
of imprisonment. 
The step one factors relate to harm and culpability. Examples of factors 
indicating greater harm include soiling, ransacking, or vandalizing the property 
during the burglary, and committing the offense while the occupier is at home. 
Factors indicating higher culpability include a significant degree of planning and 
carrying a weapon. Lesser harm is indicated when the damage was limited or 
nothing was stolen. Lower culpability circumstances include when the offender 
was exploited by others or the offender had a mental disorder. The exhaustive 
nature of the list of factors is an innovation, and means that courts are restricted 
to considering only factors on the step one list when identifying which category 
is appropriate. This feature of the guidelines may play an important role in 
promoting a consistent approach to sentencing since it will restrict sentencers to 
a limited list of factors. Having determined the relevant category range, a court 
moves to step two. 
At step two, the guideline provides a sentence range as well as a starting 
point sentence for the range. Courts use the corresponding starting point 
sentence to shape a sentence that will then be modified by the remaining steps 
in the guideline. This essentially means moving up or down from the starting 
point sentence to reflect relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. Since the 
definition of a starting point has been amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009, it is worth briefly discussing the concept. 
D.  Using Starting Point Sentences 
Starting point sentences are a feature unique to the guidelines in England. 
Under the U.S. grid-based guidelines, crime seriousness and criminal history 
comprise the two dimensions and each cell of the two-dimensional matrix 
contains a range of sentence lengths. For example, in Minnesota, robbery 
carries a presumptive sentence length of between fifty and sixty-nine months for 
an offender with a single criminal-history point.25 With such narrow ranges of 
 
 25.  The Minnesota guidelines consider many aspects of an offender’s record and accord points for 
issues such as the recency of prior convictions, their relationship to the current conviction, and custody 
status at the time of the latest conviction. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2004), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/guide04.doc. 
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sentence length, starting points are presumably unnecessary and none are 
provided. The only other jurisdiction to develop numerical guidelines is New 
Zealand. The Law Commission of New Zealand created a comprehensive set of 
guidelines, although these have yet to be implemented.26 When devising its 
guidelines, the New Zealand Law Commission studied both the English and the 
U.S. schemes and ultimately declined to incorporate starting points. Whence 
the desire, and wherefore the necessity for such a feature in the English 
guidelines? 
Three justifications may be offered for starting point sentences. First, the 
concept of a starting point derives from guideline judgments of the Court of 
Appeal, which have been an element of appellate jurisprudence in England for 
decades. Incorporating starting points links the guidelines to the traditional 
source of guidance for courts of first instance, and this, in turn, may enhance the 
appeal of the guidelines for sentencers. The second justification reflects the 
psychology of human decision-making. Confronted with a range of options, 
sentencers may well enter the range at different points, with consequences for 
the sentences ultimately imposed, which could then be less consistent. Finally, if 
the new format abandoned starting points entirely, courts would be required to 
use two very different sets of guidelines—one with and one without this 
defining feature.27 
E.  Definition of Starting Point Sentence 
The new guidelines format changes the definition of the “starting point” 
sentence. The earlier SGC guidelines defined the starting point sentence in 
terms of a first offender who is convicted following a trial. Practitioners and 
scholars have often observed that this definition relies on a highly atypical 
offender profile,28 as few offenders appear for sentencing following a contested 
trial and without any criminal antecedents.29 The starting point for the Council’s 
guidelines applies to all offenders, irrespective of plea or previous convictions. 
 
 26.  See Warren Young & Andrea King, Sentencing Practice and Guidance in New Zealand, 22 
FED. SENT’G REP. 254 (2010); Young & Browning, supra note 3.  
 27.  I have already noted that two sets of guidelines are currently in operation, one being those 
issued by the former council and not yet replaced by the Sentencing Council. If the two sets of 
guidelines were radically different—for example, one with and the other without a starting point 
sentence—sentencing would be even more challenging for courts. 
 28.  See, e.g., Ian Edwards, Draft Sentencing Guidelines for Assaults, 174 CRIM. L. JUST. WKLY. 
677, 677 (2010). 
 29.  Exact statistics are not available, but in 2009, only fourteen percent of offenders appeared for 
sentencing without any prior convictions. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING STATISTICS: 
ENGLAND AND WALES 2009 at 82 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/ 
statistics/mojstats/sentencing-stats/sentencing-stats2009.pdf. Similarly, only thirty percent of defendants 
in 2011 who entered a plea pleaded not guilty. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL AND COURT 
STATISTICS 2011, at 47 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/statistics/courts-and-
sentencing/jcs-2011/judicial-court-stats-2011.pdf. The percentage of defendants pleading not guilty and 
having no prior convictions is likely to be small. 
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This change in the definition of the starting point found favor with respondents 
to the professional consultation,30 and has been welcomed by practitioners. 
F.  Step Two: Shaping the Provisional Sentence 
Step two of the guideline requires a court to “fine tune” its provisional 
sentence (based on the category starting point) by reference to a list of 
aggravating or mitigating factors that relate to crime seriousness, culpability, or 
personal mitigation. In the words of the guideline, these circumstances provide 
“the context of the offence and the offender.” This second step also involves a 
change from the previous guideline, which required a court to first consider 
aggravating factors and then subsequently consider mitigating factors. 
Considering both kinds of factors simultaneously represents a more holistic 
approach to the determination of seriousness. 
The aggravating factors contained in the domestic burglary guideline 
include committing the offense while on bail or licence and committing the 
offense at night when a child was at home, while under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, or whilst the offender was on licence for a previous offense. The 
guideline also specifies factors that reduce seriousness, including an absence of 
prior convictions and the fact that the offender was a subordinate member of a 
gang. Consistent with the relatively expansive perspective on mitigation 
characteristic of sentencing in this jurisdiction,31 a diverse collection of factors is 
cited as personal mitigation, including remorse, the fact that the offender was a 
sole or primary carer for dependent relatives and, more controversially, “good 
character and/or exemplary conduct.”32 Most importantly, the guideline makes 
it clear that the list of factors at step two is, unlike step one, non-exhaustive. 
The non-exhaustive nature of the list creates additional discretion for a court as 
well as room for counsels’ submissions on personal mitigation to reflect the 
highly variable circumstances of individual offenders. 
G.  Primary and Secondary Factors 
The two-step format may be described as employing primary and secondary 
factors to determine crime seriousness and culpability. Thus, step one considers 
elements that have the most important influence on sentence severity—for 
 
 30.  See SENTENCING COUNCIL, ASSAULT GUIDELINES 5 (2011), available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Assault_guideline_-_Response_to_the_consultation.pdf. 
 31.  Ashworth, for example, notes that “in practice the range of factors advanced in mitigation is 
enormously wide.” ASHWORTH, supra note 6, at 170. 
 32.  It is controversial because this factor is unrelated to harm or culpability, and raises the 
possibility that the offender is being sentenced for his character. For a discussion of the role of 
mitigation and the effect of guidelines, see the exchange in Julian V. Roberts, Mike Hough & Andrew 
Ashworth, Personal Mitigation, Public Opinion and Sentencing Guidelines in England and Wales, 2011 
CRIM. L. REV. 524 and Austin Lovegrove, There Are More Things in the Public’s Sentencing Than in 
Your Philosphy: A Response to Roberts, Hough and Ashworth, 2011 CRIM. L. REV. 531. For mitigation 
and aggravation more generally, see MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING (Julian V. 
Roberts ed., 2011). 
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example, the presence of a knife or other weapon where this is not the cause of 
a separate criminal charge. Step two, on the other hand, identifies those 
circumstances that are relevant to seriousness or culpability, but which should 
carry less weight. The guideline does not actually make this primary–secondary 
distinction explicit, although it may be implied by the phrase “principal factual 
elements of the offence” to describe step one and “additional factual elements” 
to describe step two.33 
It is always going to be challenging to ensure that the two stages are clearly 
distinguishable. Some factors identified at step one may not be viewed by all as 
primordial, and some factors assigned to step two may not be seen as secondary 
in nature. For example, vandalizing the property may not always be more 
important than committing an offense that results in the victim having to leave 
her home, although the first circumstance is found in step one, the latter in step 
two. Previous convictions provide another illustration of the complexities of 
assigning sentencing factors to one of the two stages. Despite the fact that 
criminal history is generally considered to be an important sentencing factor—
after all it is one of the statutory sentencing factors—it is consigned to step two, 
where it will, for better or worse, have less impact on the quantum of 
punishment. 
H.  Incorporating Thresholds for a Community Order and Custody 
At step two, the guideline incorporates consideration of the statutory 
thresholds for custody as opposed to community-based disposals.34 The 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 articulates the sentencing principle of restraint with 
respect to both the imposition of a term of custody and the duration of any 
custodial term. Section 152(2) specifies that “[t]he court must not pass a 
custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or the 
combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so 
serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for 
the offence.”35 Section 153(2) of the same statute states that “the custodial 
sentence must be for the shortest term (not exceeding the permitted maximum) 
that in the opinion of the court is commensurate with the seriousness of the 
offence, or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated 
with it.”36 
The custodial threshold is now embedded in the guideline, an important 
omission from the previous guidelines. Thus the new format guideline advises 
that when sentencing category 2 or 3 offenses (the two less-serious categories), 
the court should also consider (1) whether the custodial threshold has been 
passed, (2) if it has been met, whether a custodial sentence is unavoidable, and 
 
 33.  SENTENCING COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 8–9. 
 34.  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 148(1), 152(2); see also Ashworth, supra note 6, at 300. 
 35.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 152(2). 
 36.  Id. § 153(2). 
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finally (3) whether the sentence of imprisonment should be suspended. These 
directions constitute a salutary reminder to sentencers of the statutory 
requirement to consider the hierarchy of sanctions and the statutory criteria 
that must be fulfilled before specific disposals are imposed. Under the previous 
guideline, the statutory thresholds were cited only by cross-reference to the 
guideline on overarching seriousness. 
I.  Additional Steps Towards Final Disposition 
After step two, a court proceeds through the remaining seven steps of the 
guidelines methodology, which may be briefly summarized. Step three directs 
courts to take into account provisions in the Serious Organized Crime and 
Police Act 200537 that permit a court to reduce sentence in cases where the 
offender has provided (or offered to provide) assistance to the prosecution or 
police. Any potential reduction here is independent of the reduction for the 
guilty plea, although the utilitarian justification is the same in both cases. 
Step four invokes sentence reductions for a guilty plea. Section 144 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 permits a court to reduce a sentence in cases where 
the accused entered a guilty plea.38 The magnitude of the discount is not 
specified in the statute, but guidance is provided in the definitive guideline 
issued by the former Sentencing Guidelines Council.39 This guideline creates a 
sliding scale of discounts according to which an offender is entitled to a 
reduction of up to one third if the plea is entered at first reasonable 
opportunity, with the reduction declining to one tenth for pleas entered only on 
the day of the trial. This guidance is still in effect, although the Sentencing 
Council has a statutory duty to issue a definitive guideline40 and will do at some 
future point. 
Step five requires courts to consider whether, having regard to the criteria 
contained in chapter 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, it would be appropriate 
to impose an extended sentence. The totality principle41 is invoked at step six 
for cases in which the court is sentencing an offender for more than a single 
offense, or where the offender is currently serving a sentence. This principle 
requires courts to adjust the sentence to ensure that the total sentence is just 
and proportionate to the offending behaviour. 
Step seven reminds sentencers that in all cases they should consider whether 
to make a compensation order and or any other ancillary orders. Section 174 of 
 
 37.  Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, 2005, c. 15, §§ 73–74. 
 38.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 144. 
 39.  See SENTENCING COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA 5–6 (2007), 
available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_-
Revised_2007.pdf. 
 40.  Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 120. 
 41.  In 2012, the Council issued a guideline dealing with the application of the totality principle. See 
SENTENCING COUNCIL, OFFENSES TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION AND TOTALITY (2012), available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Definitive_guideline_TICs__totality_Final_web.pdf. 
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the Criminal Justice Act 2003 imposes a duty on courts to give reasons and to 
explain, for the benefit of the offender and others, the effect of the sentence, 
and this duty is encapsulated in step eight. The final step (nine) directs courts to 
consider whether to give credit for time spent on remand or on bail, in 
accordance with sections 240 and 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
III 
COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENT:  
HOW BINDING ARE THE ENGLISH SENTENCING GUIDELINES? 
Having described the structure of the guidelines, it is time to turn to the 
most critical element of any guidelines scheme: the extent to which courts are 
required to comply with the guidelines. In other jurisdictions the duty of a court 
to follow guidelines is usually quite strict. One recent model for a compliance 
provision is contained in the proposed New Zealand sentencing guidelines.42 
The statute regulating these guidelines states that “a court must impose a 
sentence that is consistent with any sentencing guidelines that are relevant in 
the offender’s case, unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the 
interests of justice to do so.”43 
The jurisdiction with the most experience with presumptive sentencing 
guidelines is of course the United States, where guidelines exist in most states 
and also at the federal level. Across the United States, most guideline systems 
employ numerical, presumptively binding guidelines and with a more rigorous 
compliance requirement than the New Zealand model. The Minnesota 
guidelines are representative of these systems. The compliance requirement in 
that state is that the sentencing judge must find, and record, “substantial and 
compelling” reasons why the presumptive guidelines sentence would be too 
high or too low in a given case.44 
The phrase “substantial and compelling reasons” implies that only a small 
minority of sentences should fall outside the guidelines. This interpretation is 
supported by the guidelines manual in that state, which notes that “[t]he 
[departure] factors are intended to describe specific situations involving a small 
number of cases.”45 Indeed, the Minnesota guidelines manual warns users that 
“the purposes of the Guidelines cannot be achieved unless the presumptive 
sentences are applied with a high degree of regularity. Sentencing disparity 
cannot be reduced if courts depart from the Guidelines frequently, certainty in 
sentencing cannot be attained if departure rates are high.”46 
 
 42.  See Young & Browning, supra note 3. 
 43.  Sentencing Amendment Act 2007 § 12 (N.Z.). 
 44.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
COMMENTARY 2 (2012) (emphasis added), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/ 
2012%20MN%20Sentencing%20Guidelines%20and%20Commentary.pdf. 
 45.  Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
 46.  Id. at 40 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the state of Oregon, the administrative rules relating 
to the guidelines state that “the sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence provided by 
01_ROBERTS_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:48 PM 
12 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:1 
A.  England and Wales 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 amended the requirement for courts 
with respect to sentencing guidelines. According to the Criminal Justice Act 
2003—the statute in force until passage of the Coroners and Justice Act in 
2009—courts were directed that in sentencing an offender, they “must have 
regard to any guidelines which are relevant to the offender’s case.”47 Section 
174(2) of the same Act provided that “where guidelines indicate that a sentence 
of a particular kind, or within a particular range, would normally be appropriate 
for the offence and the sentence is of a different kind, or is outside that range, 
state the court’s reasons for deciding on a sentence of a different kind or 
outside that range.”48 Thus a court simply had to consider (“have regard to”) 
the Council’s guidelines and to give reasons in the event that a “departure” 
sentence was imposed.49 
B.  The Current Compliance Requirement in England 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 creates the following duty on a court 
with respect to the guidelines: 
(1) Every court— 
(a) must, in sentencing an offender, follow any sentencing guidelines which are 
relevant to the offender’s case, and 
(b) must, in exercising any other function relating to the sentencing of offenders, 
follow any sentencing guidelines which are relevant to the exercise of that 
function, 
unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do 
so. . . . 
(3) the duty imposed on a court by subsection (1)(a) to follow any sentencing 
guidelines which are relevant to the offender’s case includes – 
(a) in all cases, a duty to impose on P, in accordance with the offence-specific 
guidelines, a sentence which is within the offence range, and 
(b) where the offence-specific guidelines describe categories of case in 
accordance with section 121(2), a duty to decide which of the categories most 
resembles P’s case in order to identify the sentencing starting point in the 
offence range; 
but nothing in this section imposes on the court a separate duty, in a case within 
paragraph (b), to impose a sentence which is within the category range.
50
 
The relatively robust language “must . . . follow” is therefore qualified by 
the words creating the discretion to impose a different sentence if following the 
guidelines would not be in the interests of justice. In addition, the statute 
 
the guidelines unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure.” OR. 
ADMIN. R. 213-008-001 (2012), available at http://www.oregon.gov/CJC/SG.shtml. 
 47.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 172(1). 
 48.  Id. § 174(2). 
 49.  Id. § 172. 
 50.  Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 125 (emphasis added). 
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clarifies what is meant by the duty to sentence within a range.51 As noted, most 
offenses are stratified into several levels of seriousness, each with its own range 
of sentence. The duty on courts is to sentence within the total offense range, 
rather than the narrower range associated with any particular category of 
seriousness.52 The total offense range is relatively wide and naturally increases 
to reflect the seriousness of the offense. For example, domestic burglary carries 
a total sentence range of a low-level community order to six years in custody; a 
court may sentence anywhere in this range and still be compliant with the 
guidelines.53 
More serious offenses carry a much wider range of sentence within which a 
court may impose a sentence and remain compliant with the guidelines. For 
robbery, a court may impose a custodial sentence of up to twelve years in length 
and remain compliant with the guidelines—a degree of discretion that has been 
criticized by some commentators for being too permissive.54 In the event that 
the court imposes a sentence outside the overall range—in the interests of 
justice—it must give reasons for its decision. The provisions in the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 focus a court’s attention on the relevance of the guidelines, yet 
permit considerable judicial discretion to impose a fit sentence.55 
C.  Sentencing Outside the Total Offense Range 
As noted, the total offense range for domestic burglary  runs from a low-
level community order up to six-years custody, yet the maximum penalty for 
this offense is fourteen-years imprisonment when tried on indictment. A 
custodial “zone” therefore exists between the guideline range ceiling of six 
years and the statutory limit of fourteen-years imprisonment. For the most 
serious offenses, this zone between the ceiling of the total offense range and the 
statutory maximum will be greater than the eight-year range for domestic 
burglary. Accordingly, a natural question to pose is, what is the relationship 
between a definitive guideline and the statutory maximum? Answering the 
question requires a brief reflection on the role of a guideline. 
Sentencing guidelines provide courts with guidance as to the appropriate 
disposals for most cases; they do not encompass cases falling at the extremes of 
mitigation or aggravation. It is to be anticipated that most cases will be 
accommodated within the total offense range specified by the guideline; 
 
 51.  The relevant provision in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 did not specify whether compliance 
entailed sentencing within the category range or the wider offense range, although a number of 
appellate decisions endorsed the former interpretation. See Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines 
and Judicial Discretion: Evolution of the Duty of Courts to Comply in England and Wales, 51 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 997, 5 (2011). 
 52.  For further discussion, see id. 
 53.  See SENTENCING COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 8–9, available at http://sentencingcouncil. 
judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary_Definitive_Guideline_web_final.pdf. 
 54.  Andrew Ashworth, Coroners and Justice Act 2009: Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing 
Council, 2010 CRIM. L. REV. 389. 
 55.  See Roberts, supra note 51. 
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however, there will be a small number of cases that fall into the most serious 
category (category 1) yet for whom a term of custody in excess of six years is 
proportionate. Equally, some cases conforming to the lowest level of 
seriousness category may warrant a disposal less punitive than a fine. 
Imposition of a sentence beneath a low-level community order (the floor of the 
total offense range) would require justification. Using the language of the 
statute, this justification would entail an explanation of why it would be 
“contrary to the interests of justice” to impose a sentence within the guideline 
total offense range.56 
IV 
EMERGING ISSUES AND CHALLENGES TO THE GUIDELINES 
A.  Compliance Rates 
Compliance statistics are routinely collected and published by the U.S. 
sentencing commissions. One of the curiosities of the English guidelines is that 
comprehensive compliance statistics have never been published. The 
explanation for this is that the previous guidelines authorities had neither the 
mandate nor the resources to take the appropriate steps to collect such data. As 
the first statutory body created to promote guidelines (in 1998), the Sentencing 
Advisory Panel was preoccupied with promoting the guidelines—a necessary 
first step before compliance could be measured. The SGC co-sponsored a large 
data collection exercise in 2006,57 but this research was terminated before data 
became available. The new Council has a statutory duty to monitor the 
“operation and effect of its sentencing guidelines.”58 More specifically, the 
Council must “discharge its duty . . . with a view to drawing conclusions about 
the frequency with which, and the extent to which, courts depart from 
sentencing guidelines.”59 
B.  Compliance Trends 
In 2012 the Sentencing Council issued the first year’s worth of data from its 
survey of Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS).60 This survey requires 
Crown court judges to complete a form summarizing the key elements of the 
sentencing decision, including the critical question of whether the sentence 
imposed was within or outside the guidelines. The first statistical release does 
 
 56.  Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 125(1)(b). 
 57.  See generally MANDEEP DHAMI AND KAREN SOUZA, SENTENCING AND ITS OUTCOMES 
PROJECT: PART ONE PILOT STUDY REPORT  (2009), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110201125714/http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/sente
ncing-outcomes-research.htm. 
 58.  Coroners and Justice Act 2009 § 128(1)(a). 
 59.  Id. § 128(2)(a). 
 60.  SENTENCING COUNCIL, CROWN COURT SENTENCING SURVEY (2012), available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/CCSS_Annual_2011.pdf. 
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not provide “departure” statistics for all sentences imposed but only for three 
assault offenses; subsequent releases will presumably provide comprehensive 
statistics on this issue. 
With respect to the three offenses for which compliance data were released 
(assault occasioning actual bodily harm), the statistics confirm the expectation 
that having defined compliance in terms of the total offense range (rather than 
the category-specific range), very few dispositions will fall outside the 
compliance zone. For the three offenses, as expected, almost all sentences fall 
within the guidelines range. For two of the assault offenses, only three percent 
of sentences fell outside the guidelines range, while for the third offense eight 
percent were outside the range.61  
C.  Role of Guidelines in Responding to Punitive Surges 
One of the functions of sentencing guidelines is to serve as a “circuit 
breaker,” preventing bursts of punitiveness from affecting sentencing 
practices.62 One obvious source of increased severity is the legislature, where 
politicians sometimes introduce tough mandatory sentences that distort 
sentencing practices and undermine principles such as proportionality and 
restraint.63 
A less obvious source of episodic punitiveness is the judiciary itself. If courts 
have great discretion at sentencing, and appellate courts intervene only 
relatively rarely, individual sentencers may feel emboldened to periodically 
pursue harsher than normal sentencing in an attempt to curb rising crime rates. 
For example, sentencers may draw upon their personal observations of a local 
rise in offending to impose “exemplary,” punitive sentences. It may also be the 
case that the judicial culture in some jurisdictions is more responsive to public 
pressure to “get tough” with offenders. Some researchers have argued that the 
courts in England have been influenced by a public desire to punish offenders 
more severely.64 For example, sensitivity to public pressure has been cited as 
one cause of the sharp rise in the prison population in England since 1995.65 This 
 
 61.  Id. at 26–28. 
 62.  Another constraint on responsive bursts of punitiveness would be some kind of delay—waiting 
until the punitive atmosphere triggered by such mass disorder dissipates. The courts in August and 
September wasted little time in sentencing offenders convicted of riot-related offending. Incorporating 
some kind of “second look” at sentencing beyond the conventional avenue of appellate review might 
also prevent excessive sentencing at times of high emotion, although no such mechanism exists in 
England and Wales. 
 63.  A good example is Canada, where the federal government has been introducing mandatory 
sentences of imprisonment for the last few years; the latest draft of such sentences are contained in An 
Act to Enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to Amend the State Immunity Act, the 
Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Corrections and Conditional Release 
Act, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and Other Acts. 
Bill, 2011, H.C., Bill [C-10]. 
 64.  See, e.g., M. HOUGH ET AL., THE DECISION TO IMPRISON: SENTENCING AND THE PRISON 
POPULATION 26 (2003). 
 65.  Andrew Millie et al., Understanding the Growth in the Prison Population in England and 
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jurisdiction may be more susceptible than most to such pressures in light of the 
fact that most sentencing decisions (approximately ninety-seven percent in 
2009) are taken by lay magistrates. One of the justifications for lay sentencing is 
to incorporate community values to a greater degree than may be possible with 
a professional judiciary. 
D.  Sentencing Offenders Convicted of Offenses During the 2011 Riots 
A guidelines scheme would (and should) constrain both legislators and 
sentencers from periodic surges of punitiveness. In August 2011, the 
extraordinary riots taking place in a number of English cities created an 
unexpected and unwelcome challenge for the guidelines. Over three 
consecutive nights, large numbers of individuals participated in mass looting in 
several cities including Birmingham, Manchester, London, and Bristol. Charges 
were laid for a wide range of offenses including burglary of a commercial 
property, receiving stolen goods, and theft. 
The judiciary responded expeditiously to the individuals convicted of 
offenses occurring during this period; in doing so, some judgments undermined 
the guidelines by affirming that the offense was so far removed from 
conventional offending to render the sentencing guidelines irrelevant. 
Considerable controversy arose over a memo sent around magistrates’ courts 
by a legal advisor. The email advised courts to depart from the guidelines, 
asserting that “[t]he Sentencing Guidelines cannot sensibly be used to 
determine the sentence in cases arising from the recent disturbance/looting. 
When the guidelines were written, nothing like this was envisaged.”66 This 
memo attracted considerable commentary in the news media and seemed to 
suggest that courts would disregard the guidelines in all cases. 
An early judgment, issued by the Manchester Recorder following 
consultation with fellow judges in that city, is particularly significant. After 
noting that the context of the offenses committed takes them “completely 
outside the usual context of criminality,” the court in R. v. Carter assumed the 
view that existing sentencing guidelines “can properly be departed from.”67 The 
judgment then outlines new starting point sentences and sentencing ranges for a 
wide range of offenses.68 The Manchester Recorder’s “guidelines” were 
 
Wales, in THE PERSISTENT PRISON: PROBLEMS, IMAGES AND ALTERNATIVES 102–04 (Clive Emsley 
ed., 2005). 
 66.  The memo was ultimately made public by the Ministry of Justice in response to a Freedom of 
Information request. 
 67.  Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Carter, [2011] EW Misc 12 (CrownC).  See also Julian Baggini, 
Guilty?: Can the Harsh Sentences Being Handed to Last Week’s Rioters Be Justified?, GUARDIAN 
(London), Aug. 18, 2011, at 4, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/17/england-riots-
harsh-sentences-justified (under the title England Riots: Are Harsh Sentences for Offenders Justified?). 
 68.  Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Carter, [2011] EW Misc 12 (CrownC). The criminal justice system 
could not be faulted for being slow to respond; many offenders were located, charged, brought to court 
and having entered guilty pleas were sentenced less than a week after the offenses had been committed. 
Ten cases were then heard by the Court of Appeal within a month. 
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immediately followed by a number of judgments from other courts, all of which 
endorsed the Carter ranges.69 A typical example is found in R. v. Twemlow.70 
One of these offenders (McGrath) had entered a previously looted supermarket 
where he was arrested by police and subsequently pleaded guilty to burglary of 
a business premise. The twenty-one-year-old offender, a university student, was 
regarded by the court as of good character, and a pre-sentence report 
recommended imposition of a non-custodial sanction. The definitive guideline 
for burglary in a building other than a dwelling in effect at the time has three 
levels of seriousness. The lowest level applies to burglary involving goods 
valued under £2,000 and carries a range of a fine to six-months custody with a 
starting point sentence of a community order. This would appear to be the 
relevant category for the McGrath case. In the event, the court sentenced this 
offender to twenty-four-months imprisonment, reduced to eighteen months to 
reflect the early guilty plea. This case provides some indication of the 
aggravating power of the riot context, at least as manifest in this early judgment. 
E.  Sentencing Ranges in the “Ersatz” Guidelines 
How much higher are the sentence length ranges specified in the Carter 
decision? Although the judgment notes that the current guidelines are “of much 
less weight in the context of the current case,” the Carter guidelines must be 
seen in some context. Direct comparisons between the existing definitive 
guidelines and those in Carter are complicated by differences in guideline 
structures; nevertheless, some conclusions may reasonably be drawn. A 
comprehensive comparison is beyond the scope of a brief commentary; one 
common offense may serve as an illustration: burglary from a non-dwelling. 
As noted, the Sentencing Guidelines Council definitive guideline for 
burglary in a building other than a dwelling was still in effect at the time of the 
riots;71 it stipulates a sentence range of a fine to twenty-six weeks custody for 
property valued under £2,000. The SGC guideline applies to a first offender, so 
the twenty-six weeks should be increased somewhat for the purposes of 
comparison. If we consider the upper limit for this level of the offense to be 
higher, say, forty weeks to reflect this consideration, the aggravating effect of 
the riot context is nevertheless very striking. Under Carter, a burglar who takes 
part in breaking into a business premise is subject to a sentence length range 
 
 69.  See Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Twemlow, [2011] EW Misc 14 (CrownC). The Court noted the 
following: “I expressly agree with the observations of HHJ Gilbart QC. In passing sentence he set out 
the ranges of sentences which are to be imposed. I respectfully agree with those ranges.” Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  As noted, the Sentencing Council has issued a definitive guideline for non-domestic burglary. 
See SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, NON-DOMESTIC BURGLARY: THEFT ACT 1968, available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary_Definitive_Guideline_Magistrates_web.pdf. If 
we compare the Carter ranges with the appropriate range of sentence identified in the new guideline, 
the same conclusion emerges: the ranges contained in the Carter judgment are much higher. The range 
for the middle level of seriousness in the new guideline runs from a low-level community order to fifty-
one-weeks custody, far short of the seven-year maximum established by the Manchester judges. 
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with an upper limit of 364 weeks (seven years).72 The aggravating impact of the 
antecedent events at the time of the offending thus has a dramatic impact on the 
severity of punishments. 
The challenge to the guidelines was therefore two-fold. First, the ad hoc 
sentencing ranges reflect a high degree of aggravation that undermines the 
integrity of the guidelines; second, by prescribing a new set of starting points 
and sentence ranges for a raft of offenses, the judgment effectively creates an 
additional level of guidelines authority: local courts. Let us address these two 
issues in turn. 
F.  Impact of Aggravating Factors on Proportionate Sentencing 
Aggravating factors at sentencing should enhance the quantum of 
punishment in proportion to the elevated harm of the offense or culpability of 
the offender. The extent to which factor X aggravates the sentence in case Y is 
properly left to judicial discretion. It is impossible for Parliament73 to decide a 
priori that any given circumstance should increase the quantum of punishment 
by say, one-quarter or one-half in all cases. To do so would deprive sentencing 
of the individualization necessary to achieve a just and proportionate sentence. 
A guideline can offer some guidance on the appropriate range of sentence 
resulting from an aggravating circumstance. 
The reduction for a guilty plea is a good example. At present,74 the definitive 
guideline recommends that a court reduce the sentence by up to one-third, in 
the event that the defendant entered a plea at the earliest opportunity.75 Courts 
retain the discretion to award a greater reduction in exceptional cases, but such 
cases will be rare and will entail the court invoking the interests of justice 
provision in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to step outside the guideline 
maximum of one-third.76 If courts were allowed (or encouraged) to select any 
magnitude of discount, consistency and indeed proportionality in sentencing 
would be threatened. The same may be said for aggravation; the impact of an 
aggravating factor should be constrained by the gravity of the predicate conduct 
of the offense of conviction. If the tariff for, say, a common assault without 
injury to the victim were a community order, the sentence should not rise to 
several years in prison in the event that the assault was aggravated by being 
 
 72.  If we consider fifteen weeks as an approximate midpoint of the existing guideline and five and 
one-half years (286 weeks) as the midpoint of the enhanced guideline, the latter is much longer than the 
former. See Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Carter, [2011] EW Misc 12 (CrownC). 
 73.  This is one reason why legislatures and guidelines authorities around the world have declined 
to provide guidance as to the quantum of aggravation or mitigation associated with sentencing factors. 
 74.  The Coroners and Justice Act 2009  directs the Sentencing Council to issue a guideline on the 
reduction for a guilty plea and a draft guideline will be issued at a later point. Coroners and Justice Act, 
2009, c. 25, § 120(3)(a). 
 75.  SENTENCING COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA 5–6 (2007), available 
at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_-Revised_ 
2007.pdf. 
 76.  Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 44, § 125(1). 
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racially motivated—or this would constitute a classic case of the tail wagging the 
dog. 
G.  Threat to Ordinal Proportionality 
Ordinal proportionality is one of the requirements of desert-based 
sentencing. This requires offenses of differing seriousness to receive sentences 
of commensurate severity.77 Rank-ordering is one of the sub-requirements of 
ordinal proportionality: offenses ranked differently in terms of their relative 
seriousness should receive commensurably distinguishable penalties. 
There is a clear threat to ordinal proportionality when aggravating or 
mitigating factors have the power to increase or reduce the sentence to a great 
extent. Rankings of seriousness will be scrambled: an offense of relatively low 
seriousness will be punished at a level of severity associated with a much more 
serious offense. Moreover, proportionality is not restricted to comparisons 
within crimes of the same offense; it permeates the entire spectrum of 
offending. Sentencing must be considered in this broader perspective. To take 
an obvious example, punishing serious frauds more harshly than theft preserves 
proportionality across economic offenses, but if serious frauds result in the 
imposition of a harsher disposal than, say, manslaughter, ordinal proportion-
ality would be threatened.78 
The second threat to the guidelines involves the introduction of a new 
source of guidance, created spontaneously by a group of trial judges without the 
imprimatur of the Court of Appeal or the statutory guidelines authority (the 
Sentencing Council). In Carter, the court laid down sentencing guidelines 
ranges for a variety of offenses associated with riot-related offenses. In addition, 
the text of the judgment provides what are effectively “starting points,” when it 
notes, “As a starting point . . . any adult offender . . . who took part in crimes of 
the type I have described . . . must expect to lose his or [her] liberty for a 
significant period.”79 The language suggests a judicial presumption of custody in 
all cases. 
Since they were developed in relation to behaviour defined as outside the 
scope of current guidelines, it is unsurprising that they are at odds with existing 
definitive guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council and its predecessors. 
Moreover, unlike the definitive guidelines which courts must follow,80 the 
Manchester guidelines were not developed after any systematic research, 
without a protracted public and professional consultation, and were not subject 
to any parliamentary scrutiny.81 In short, they represent the personal sentencing 
 
 77.  See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 18–19 (Clarendon Press 1993). 
 78.  This is why guidelines authorities generally devise guidelines for all offenses simultaneously, 
rather than developing them seriatim on an offense-by-offense basis, as has been the case in England 
and Wales. 
 79.  Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Carter, [2011] EW Misc 12, at 6 (CrownC) (emphasis added). 
 80.  According to section 125(1)(a) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
 81.  These steps are all necessary before the Sentencing Council issues a definitive guideline. See 
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preferences of a small group of judges in one city—ersatz guidelines, if you like. 
It would be inappropriate for courts in other cities to follow the Manchester 
guidelines. If this occurred, it would mark the introduction of another player in 
the already-crowded sentencing environment. Thus, Parliament creates the 
statutory framework (including sentencing objectives and certain sentencing 
principles); the Court of Appeal periodically issues guideline judgments;82 the 
Sentencing Council devises and issues definitive guidelines; and now local 
courts have evolved their own tariffs and ranges. 
The importance of ensuring that guidance emanates from the Council or 
Court of Appeal is not restricted to rare occurrences such as the August riots. 
Although the sentencing “guidelines” which arose in August 2011 did so in 
relation to a rare event, less dramatic instances of local court initiatives may 
well arise. For example, if courts perceive a sudden rise in a particular form of 
criminality in their area, they may decide to impose exemplary sentences by 
setting higher ranges in the interests of deterring such conduct. 
H.  Response of the Sentencing Council and the Court of Appeal 
How did the legitimate sources of guidance respond to the sentences 
imposed in the riot cases, and in particular the Manchester Recorder’s 
guidelines? The Sentencing Council discussed riot-related sentencing and issued 
a press statement to the effect that the Court of Appeal would shortly be 
hearing appeals arising from sentencing decisions involving riot-related 
offending and that the Council would not be commenting further.83 One reason 
why the Council did not issue a substantive response was that in order to issue a 
revised guideline or a new definitive guideline dealing with offending during a 
period of social disorder, the Council would have a statutory duty to follow 
several steps, including an extensive period of public consultation lasting several 
months.84 The Court of Appeal, however, can act more expeditiously once it has 
received an appeal, and it had rather more to say in a lengthy judgment issued 
in October 2011. 
I.  R. v. Blackshaw85 
On the critical issue of relevance to this article, the Court of Appeal took a 
clear position. It noted that “[i]t is however inappropriate for Crown Court 
 
Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 120(5)–(6). 
 82.  See, e.g., R. v. Saw, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1. 
 83. Statement Following Council Discussion on Sentencing for Offences Committed During the 
August Riots, SENTENCING COUNCIL (Sept. 16, 2011), http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/news-
stories.htm. The Council did incorporate a new factor of committing the offense in the “context of 
general public disorder” in the next guideline it produced, relating to the sentencing of burglary 
offenses. SENTENCING COUNCIL, BURGLARY OFFENCES DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE 8 (2011), available 
at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary_Definitive_Guideline_web_final.pdf. 
 84.  See Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c.25, § 120 (5)–(6). 
 85.  R. v. Blackshaw, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2312. 
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judges to issue, or appear to be issuing, sentencing guidelines.”86 In this sense 
the Court disagreed with the Manchester Recorder . However, the two courts 
were in agreement that the riot-related offending was of a nature not envisaged 
by—and therefore not encompassed within—the existing guidelines. The Court 
of Appeal quoted and endorsed the Manchester’s recorder’s judgment: “. . . the 
context in which the offences of the 9th August were committed takes them 
completely outside the usual context of criminality, . . . For these reasons I 
consider that the Sentencing Guidelines for specific offences are of much less 
weight in the context of the current case [and] can properly be departed from.”87 
Blackshaw therefore strengthens the role of guidelines in one respect—
noting that only the Council and the Court of Appeal have the authority to 
issue sentencing guidelines. But at the same time, in reviewing the specific cases 
on appeal, the Court provided no link to the offense-specific guidelines as a 
point of departure, nor any link to an important generic guideline—namely that 
of over-arching seriousness.88 The offense-specific guidelines may be of limited 
utility in sentencing riot-related offending (except as a point of departure), but 
the principles guiding the determination of seriousness apply across the entire 
range of crime seriousness—which is why it is an overarching guideline in the 
first place. In fact, the guideline ranges are sufficiently high to accommodate 
aggravation of this kind, even though it was not anticipated when the guideline 
was constructed. Had courts not abandoned the guidelines so readily they could 
have drawn upon the many sources of guidance and still imposed enhanced 
sentences.89 
J.  Achieving Consistency 
Communications dealing with the guidelines or emanating from the 
Sentencing Council repeatedly stress that the aim is to promote consistency of 
approach rather than consistency of outcome, although greater consistency in 
the way that sentencers around the country approach sentencing will surely 
promote more consistent outcomes. The challenge to a guidelines authority is to 
ensure that the guidelines are followed. In the English context, however, it is 
worth noting that a number of elements permit considerable latitude to a court 
at sentencing, and it is worth recapitulating these at this point. 
1. First, the enabling statute permits a court to impose a sentence outside the 
guidelines, if it would not be in the interests of justice to follow them—the 
‘departure’ provision; 
2. Second, compliance with the guideline is defined by the statute as imposing 
 
 86.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
 87.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
 88.  SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES: SERIOUSNESS (2004), 
available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Web_Seriousness_Guideline.pdf. 
 89.  For a discussion of how courts sentencing riot-related offending could have benefited from the 
guidelines, see Julian V. Roberts, Points of Departure: Reflections on Sentencing Outside the Definitive 
Guidelines Ranges, 2012 CRIM. L. REV. 439. 
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a sentence within the relatively wide total offense range—not the more 
restrictive category range—the difference between the two ranges being 
very large; 
3. Third, movement between the categories of seriousness is permitted: having 
determined that a particular category range is appropriate, a court may 
nevertheless later move into a higher or lower category if there is a 
sufficient constellation of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
There is therefore a high degree of flexibility—courts are able to move 
around within the guidelines and are not restricted to a particular category-level 
range; as well, they may escape the guidelines altogether by means of the 
“interests of justice” test. Ultimately, consistency will arise not through 
restrictive limits on the sentencing discretion in any particular case, but by the 
imposition of a step-by-step methodology. The idea is, presumably, that if all 
sentencers follow the same method, a more consistent approach will be the 
consequence and consistency will ensue. 
Critics of the English guidelines and the statutory provisions regulating their 
application may argue that the degree of flexibility permitted by both will result 
in only modest gains in terms of consistency and predictability of outcomes. 
Time will tell; no evaluation research has yet been conducted to determine the 
effect of the guidelines on sentencing practices in trial courts. Once the new-
format guidelines have been given an opportunity to “bed down,” it should be 
possible to conduct some analyses of sentencing practices before and after 
introduction of a specific guideline. It is clear, however, that a more restrictive 
regime, with a tighter compliance requirement, would almost certainly have 
proved unacceptable to the judiciary in England.90 
K.  Guidelines and the Prison Population 
This article has explored the nature and function of the English guidelines. 
Perhaps it is worth commenting on what these guidelines do not do. The 
Sentencing Commission Working Group lamented the inability to make prison 
projections with a degree of accuracy found in states such as Minnesota.91 This is 
one reason why the Working Group recommended a tighter compliance 
requirement—to ensure that a higher proportion of sentences fell within the 
guidelines ranges; only once this occurred would prison population projections 
become more precise. 
However, the English guidelines were not designed to constrain prison 
admissions, and, ironically, the first decade under the guidelines also witnessed 
an increase in the size of the prison population.92 This growth in the prison 
 
 90.  The judiciary encompasses lay magistrates courts as well as Crown courts. It is possible that lay 
magistrates would have found a more restrictive guidelines regime acceptable, since they have been 
using a set of guidelines applicable to their jurisdiction for a longer period of time. 
 91.  SENTENCING COMMISSION WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 14. 
 92.  The guidelines were not responsible for this increase of course, which was triggered by a 
number of factors such as an increased tendency to use custody, independent of any changes in the 
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population was incremental and long-term, but the guidelines also fail to 
contain short-term bursts in punitiveness of the kind discussed in this article. 
Guidelines advocates who believe that guidelines should be responsive to—and 
constrain—prison populations will see this feature of the English arrangements 
as a clear weakness. 
The problem is exacerbated because the statutory language of the custodial 
threshold is not particularly rigorous. Thus, section 152(2) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 provides that the court must not pass a custodial sentence 
unless it is of the opinion that the offense, or the combination of the offense and 
one or more of the offenses associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine 
alone nor a community order can be justified for the offense.93 
This highlights perhaps the most problematic element of sentencing in this 
jurisdiction: the subjective threshold for the imposition of a term of custody. 
This provision has manifestly failed to constrain the use of custody as a 
sanction—but that is a story for another day. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
A number of jurisdictions are actively contemplating adopting more 
structured sentencing regimes, including some form of guidelines. The 
guidelines in England represent a useful model for consideration in this respect. 
It is too early to know definitively whether the guidelines have promoted more-
consistent sentencing in this country, although there is a strong prima facie case 
that sentencing is likely to be more consistent—in light of the methodical 
approach to determining sentence, and the high rates of judicial compliance. 
Critics may argue that the guidelines still leave too much discretion to 
individual sentencers, but tighter guidelines would likely have proven 
impossible to implement. 
 
nature of cases appearing for sentencing, and the imposition of longer terms of custody as a result of 
statutory changes to the sentencing framework. See Andrew Millie et al., supra note 58. 
 93.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 152(2). 
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VI 
APPENDIX A:  
EXAMPLE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINE STRUCTURE IN ENGLAND 
 
Offense: Domestic burglary94 
Maximum Penalty: 14-years custody (when tried on indictment) 
Total Offense Range: Low-level community order to 6-years custody 
 
Step 1: Use the factors provided in the guideline that comprise the principal 
elements of the offense95 to determine the category that is appropriate: 
 
Category 1: Greater harm and high culpability; 
Category 2: Greater harm and lower culpability or lesser harm and higher culpability; 
Category 3: Lesser harm and lower culpability. 
 
Step 2: Use the starting point from the appropriate offense category to generate 
a provisional sentence within the category range. The starting point applies to 
all offenders irrespective of plea and previous convictions. The guideline 
contains a list of additional aggravating and mitigating factors. These factors 
affect crime seriousness96 or relate to personal mitigation97 and should result in 
upward or downward adjustment from the starting point. 
 
Offense Category Starting Point Category Sentence Range 
1. 3-years custody  2- to 6-years custody 
2. 12-months custody High-level community order to  
2-years custody 
3. High-level community order Low-level community order to 
26-weeks custody 
 
Step 3: Consider if any reduction should be made to reflect assistance offered or 
provided to the prosecution. 
 
Step 4: Consider the level of reduction appropriate to reflect a guilty plea. 
 
 94.  Theft Act, 1996, c. 62. 
 95.  For example, factors indicating greater harm include violence used or threatened against 
victim, and soiling, ransacking, or vandalism of property. Factors indicating higher culpability include a 
significant degree of premeditation. Factors indicating lesser harm include limited damage or 
disturbance to property, and factors indicating lower culpability include when the offender was 
exploited by others. 
 96.  For example, factors such as gratuitous degradation of the victim and offense committed while 
offender on license. 
 97.  For example, factors such as remorse, no previous convictions, no relevant or recent 
convictions, and offender is sole carer for dependent relatives. 
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Step 5: Consider whether the offender meets dangerousness criteria necessary 
for imposition of an indeterminate or extended sentence.98 
 
Step 6: If sentencing for more than one offense, apply the totality principle to 
ensure that the total sentence is just and proportionate to the total offending 
behavior. 
 
Step 7: Consider whether to make a compensation order and/or other orders. 
 
Step 8: Give reasons for and explain the effect of the sentence on the offender. 
 
Step 9: Consider whether to give credit for time on remand or bail. 
 
 
 98.  For example, sentences such as a life sentence, imprisonment for public protection (IPP), or an 
extended sentence. 
